Bank English – Test 22

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Some words have been given in bold so that you can locate them easily while answering some of the questions.</br> There is renewed debate around Aadhaar, including one in Parliament. More recently, IT and law minister Ravi Shankar Prasad has offered his thoughts on Aadhaar. There is much to agree with the minister. Aadhaar was conceived during the AtalBihari Vajpayee government. UPA spent thousands of crores of public money on Aadhaar with no scrutiny or even legislative backing. It is to the current NDA government's credit that it rescued Aadhaar and put it to work. </br> I completely agree with and support the government's intention to create an overarching framework to better deliver subsidies and benefits. But there are questions that remain about Aadhaar that need to be addressed. Prasad refers to Aadhaar enrolment touching 113 crore or more than 99% of the adult population. But what that skips is Aadhaar is a poorly verified database, vital at a time when some in government are suggesting expanding its use as personal ID to enter airports, open bank accounts, become a voter etc. It is true that Section 3.3 of the Aadhaar Act makes UIDAI statutorily responsible for verifying the entries. But the Act was passed in 2016. Over 100 crore (88%) entries were created before it through an almost non-existent verification process. </br> While there are numerous reports of fake Aadhaars, nothing has been done to ensure that Section 3.3 has been complied with. There have been no audit reports and no prosecution of enrolment agencies for fakes. Who is accountable if there is a terror act facilitated by use of fake Aadhaar cards? If fake bank accounts opened through fake Aadhaar cards are used for money laundering who is accountable? </br> These questions are vital to the integrity of this database. If statutory verification obligations of Sections 3.3 and 4.3 are justification for Aadhaar to be used as an ID, then the problems of ghost and fake entries in Aadhaar will need to be squarely addressed through an audit and a gradual reverification of the database. Prasad is correct that Section 7 of Aadhaar Act ensures that there will be no exclusion of anyone from a subsidy or service because of not having Aadhaar. But many ministries have issued notifications that mandate Aadhaar in contravention of Section 7. </br> For many years, UIDAI has evaded tough questions and oversight. It's time for some real oversight of its regulations and its functioning. I think a permanent standing committee of Parliament to oversee UIDAI is the answer. Eventually Aadhaar must be the sole gateway to ensure genuine needy Indians get subsidies and services earmarked for them, because leakages in subsidies ultimately harm the poor and needy. But it must become mandatory only after ensuring that all conditions to prevent exclusion are met, in terms of access and enrolment. Where the minister is off the mark is on issues of privacy and data security. It's common knowledge that there have been data breaches. UIDAI is not required to say anything about them. This must be fixed in the regulations. Through its rules, UIDAI must be mandatorily required to report data breaches, including those that have taken place in the past. </br> I agree that fears of a surveillance state are misplaced. But the concern stems from the fact that UIDAI and government departments now possess large amounts of user data without any reciprocal accountability protecting against its misuse. These concerns are real and mustn't be brushed aside. Remember the furore that erupted when the telephone records of then RajyaSabha Leader of Opposition ArunJaitley were allegedly accessed by a private agency, a few years ago. </br> There is evidence that Aadhaar records are easily available from either enrolling agencies or through other sources. UIDAI has tightened up recently, but only after many cases of misuse of data. Such fears can be addressed if and only if the government and UIDAI lay out clear and public safeguards. Unfortunately the Aadhaar Act and accompanying regulations place no accountability on UIDAI to protect the database of citizens' personal information, and are silent on the liability of UIDAI and its personnel in case of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 3 and Chapter VI that require verification and protection of such data. The Minister maintains there are sufficient safeguards in the IT and the Aadhaar Acts. Respectfully, he is wrong. Current protections under both Acts are skewed in favour of those who hold the data and place an extraordinary burden on a citizen to get justice. </br> Privacy is a broader issue that goes beyond Aadhaar. It raises legitimate questions about the role and the responsibility of the state, or other agencies, that are custodians of our digital footprints at a time of rapid digitisation of our lives and economy. Privacy is a significant issue, which is why so many are worked up about it. Instead of dismissing their concerns, the government should start a real dialogue. Despite much work to address its flaws, there remain issues with Aadhaar. Let's fix them. </br>

What reason is being cited in favour of using Aadhar as an identity card? A. Easy availability of persons' details B. Maximum penetration in the country C. Use of verified data

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Some words have been given in bold so that you can locate them easily while answering some of the questions.</br> There is renewed debate around Aadhaar, including one in Parliament. More recently, IT and law minister Ravi Shankar Prasad has offered his thoughts on Aadhaar. There is much to agree with the minister. Aadhaar was conceived during the AtalBihari Vajpayee government. UPA spent thousands of crores of public money on Aadhaar with no scrutiny or even legislative backing. It is to the current NDA government's credit that it rescued Aadhaar and put it to work. </br> I completely agree with and support the government's intention to create an overarching framework to better deliver subsidies and benefits. But there are questions that remain about Aadhaar that need to be addressed. Prasad refers to Aadhaar enrolment touching 113 crore or more than 99% of the adult population. But what that skips is Aadhaar is a poorly verified database, vital at a time when some in government are suggesting expanding its use as personal ID to enter airports, open bank accounts, become a voter etc. It is true that Section 3.3 of the Aadhaar Act makes UIDAI statutorily responsible for verifying the entries. But the Act was passed in 2016. Over 100 crore (88%) entries were created before it through an almost non-existent verification process. </br> While there are numerous reports of fake Aadhaars, nothing has been done to ensure that Section 3.3 has been complied with. There have been no audit reports and no prosecution of enrolment agencies for fakes. Who is accountable if there is a terror act facilitated by use of fake Aadhaar cards? If fake bank accounts opened through fake Aadhaar cards are used for money laundering who is accountable? </br> These questions are vital to the integrity of this database. If statutory verification obligations of Sections 3.3 and 4.3 are justification for Aadhaar to be used as an ID, then the problems of ghost and fake entries in Aadhaar will need to be squarely addressed through an audit and a gradual reverification of the database. Prasad is correct that Section 7 of Aadhaar Act ensures that there will be no exclusion of anyone from a subsidy or service because of not having Aadhaar. But many ministries have issued notifications that mandate Aadhaar in contravention of Section 7. </br> For many years, UIDAI has evaded tough questions and oversight. It's time for some real oversight of its regulations and its functioning. I think a permanent standing committee of Parliament to oversee UIDAI is the answer. Eventually Aadhaar must be the sole gateway to ensure genuine needy Indians get subsidies and services earmarked for them, because leakages in subsidies ultimately harm the poor and needy. But it must become mandatory only after ensuring that all conditions to prevent exclusion are met, in terms of access and enrolment. Where the minister is off the mark is on issues of privacy and data security. It's common knowledge that there have been data breaches. UIDAI is not required to say anything about them. This must be fixed in the regulations. Through its rules, UIDAI must be mandatorily required to report data breaches, including those that have taken place in the past. </br> I agree that fears of a surveillance state are misplaced. But the concern stems from the fact that UIDAI and government departments now possess large amounts of user data without any reciprocal accountability protecting against its misuse. These concerns are real and mustn't be brushed aside. Remember the furore that erupted when the telephone records of then RajyaSabha Leader of Opposition ArunJaitley were allegedly accessed by a private agency, a few years ago. </br> There is evidence that Aadhaar records are easily available from either enrolling agencies or through other sources. UIDAI has tightened up recently, but only after many cases of misuse of data. Such fears can be addressed if and only if the government and UIDAI lay out clear and public safeguards. Unfortunately the Aadhaar Act and accompanying regulations place no accountability on UIDAI to protect the database of citizens' personal information, and are silent on the liability of UIDAI and its personnel in case of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 3 and Chapter VI that require verification and protection of such data. The Minister maintains there are sufficient safeguards in the IT and the Aadhaar Acts. Respectfully, he is wrong. Current protections under both Acts are skewed in favour of those who hold the data and place an extraordinary burden on a citizen to get justice. </br> Privacy is a broader issue that goes beyond Aadhaar. It raises legitimate questions about the role and the responsibility of the state, or other agencies, that are custodians of our digital footprints at a time of rapid digitisation of our lives and economy. Privacy is a significant issue, which is why so many are worked up about it. Instead of dismissing their concerns, the government should start a real dialogue. Despite much work to address its flaws, there remain issues with Aadhaar. Let's fix them. </br>

What measures have been provided in the Aadhar Act to prevent its misuse in financial transactions?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Some words have been given in bold so that you can locate them easily while answering some of the questions.</br> There is renewed debate around Aadhaar, including one in Parliament. More recently, IT and law minister Ravi Shankar Prasad has offered his thoughts on Aadhaar. There is much to agree with the minister. Aadhaar was conceived during the AtalBihari Vajpayee government. UPA spent thousands of crores of public money on Aadhaar with no scrutiny or even legislative backing. It is to the current NDA government's credit that it rescued Aadhaar and put it to work. </br> I completely agree with and support the government's intention to create an overarching framework to better deliver subsidies and benefits. But there are questions that remain about Aadhaar that need to be addressed. Prasad refers to Aadhaar enrolment touching 113 crore or more than 99% of the adult population. But what that skips is Aadhaar is a poorly verified database, vital at a time when some in government are suggesting expanding its use as personal ID to enter airports, open bank accounts, become a voter etc. It is true that Section 3.3 of the Aadhaar Act makes UIDAI statutorily responsible for verifying the entries. But the Act was passed in 2016. Over 100 crore (88%) entries were created before it through an almost non-existent verification process. </br> While there are numerous reports of fake Aadhaars, nothing has been done to ensure that Section 3.3 has been complied with. There have been no audit reports and no prosecution of enrolment agencies for fakes. Who is accountable if there is a terror act facilitated by use of fake Aadhaar cards? If fake bank accounts opened through fake Aadhaar cards are used for money laundering who is accountable? </br> These questions are vital to the integrity of this database. If statutory verification obligations of Sections 3.3 and 4.3 are justification for Aadhaar to be used as an ID, then the problems of ghost and fake entries in Aadhaar will need to be squarely addressed through an audit and a gradual reverification of the database. Prasad is correct that Section 7 of Aadhaar Act ensures that there will be no exclusion of anyone from a subsidy or service because of not having Aadhaar. But many ministries have issued notifications that mandate Aadhaar in contravention of Section 7. </br> For many years, UIDAI has evaded tough questions and oversight. It's time for some real oversight of its regulations and its functioning. I think a permanent standing committee of Parliament to oversee UIDAI is the answer. Eventually Aadhaar must be the sole gateway to ensure genuine needy Indians get subsidies and services earmarked for them, because leakages in subsidies ultimately harm the poor and needy. But it must become mandatory only after ensuring that all conditions to prevent exclusion are met, in terms of access and enrolment. Where the minister is off the mark is on issues of privacy and data security. It's common knowledge that there have been data breaches. UIDAI is not required to say anything about them. This must be fixed in the regulations. Through its rules, UIDAI must be mandatorily required to report data breaches, including those that have taken place in the past. </br> I agree that fears of a surveillance state are misplaced. But the concern stems from the fact that UIDAI and government departments now possess large amounts of user data without any reciprocal accountability protecting against its misuse. These concerns are real and mustn't be brushed aside. Remember the furore that erupted when the telephone records of then RajyaSabha Leader of Opposition ArunJaitley were allegedly accessed by a private agency, a few years ago. </br> There is evidence that Aadhaar records are easily available from either enrolling agencies or through other sources. UIDAI has tightened up recently, but only after many cases of misuse of data. Such fears can be addressed if and only if the government and UIDAI lay out clear and public safeguards. Unfortunately the Aadhaar Act and accompanying regulations place no accountability on UIDAI to protect the database of citizens' personal information, and are silent on the liability of UIDAI and its personnel in case of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 3 and Chapter VI that require verification and protection of such data. The Minister maintains there are sufficient safeguards in the IT and the Aadhaar Acts. Respectfully, he is wrong. Current protections under both Acts are skewed in favour of those who hold the data and place an extraordinary burden on a citizen to get justice. </br> Privacy is a broader issue that goes beyond Aadhaar. It raises legitimate questions about the role and the responsibility of the state, or other agencies, that are custodians of our digital footprints at a time of rapid digitisation of our lives and economy. Privacy is a significant issue, which is why so many are worked up about it. Instead of dismissing their concerns, the government should start a real dialogue. Despite much work to address its flaws, there remain issues with Aadhaar. Let's fix them. </br>

What is / are the chief concern(s) regarding Aadhar?