IBPS PO – IBPS PO 2014

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The wisdom of learning from failure is incontrovertible. Yet organisations that do it well are extraordinarily rare. This gap is not due to a lack of commitment to learning. Managers in the vast majority of enterprises that I have studied over the past 20 years -pharmaceutical. financial services, product design, telecommunications, and construction companies: hospitals; and NASA's space shuttle program, among others- genuinely wanted to help their organisations learn from failures to improve future performance. In some cases they and their teams had devoted many hours to afteraction reviews, postmortems, and the like. But time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change. The reason: Those managers were thinking about failure the wrong way. Most executives I've talked to believe that failure is bad (of course!). They also believe that learning from it is pretty straightforward: Ask people to reflect on what they did wrong and exhort them to avoid similar mistakes in the future-or, better yet, assign a team to review and write a report on what happened and then distribute it throughout the organisation. These widely held beliefs are misguided. First, failure is not always bad. In organisational life it is sometimes bad, sometimes inevitable, and sometimes even good. Second, learning from organisational failures is anything but straightforward. The attitudes and activities required to effectively detect and analyze failures are in short supply in most companies, and the need for context-specific learning strategies is underappreciated. Or - ganisations need new and better ways to go beyond lessons that are superficial ("Procedures weren't followed") or self-serving ("The market just wasn't ready for our great new product"). That means jettisoning old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success and embracing failure's lessons. Leaders can begin by understanding how the blame game gets in the way. The Blame Game Failure and fault are virtually inseparable in most households. organisations, and cultures. Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised. Executives I've interviewed in organisations as different as hospitals and investment banks admit to being torn: How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything-goes attitude? If people aren't blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try as hard as possible to do their best work? This concern is based on a false dichotomy. In actuality, a culture that makes it safe to admit and report on failure can-and in some organisational contexts must-coexist with high standards for performance. To understand why, look at the exhibit "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure," which lists causes ranging from deliberate deviation to thoughtful experimentation. Which of these causes involve blameworthy actions? Deliberate deviance, first on the list, obviously warrants blame. But inattention might not. If it results from a lack of effort, perhaps it's blameworthy. But if it results from fatigue near the end of an overly long shift, the manager who assigned the shift is more at fault than the employee. As we go down the list, it gets more and more difficult to find blameworthy acts. In fact, a failure resulting from thoughtful experimentation that generates valuable information may actually be praiseworthy. When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the failures in their organisations are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits-perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and their lessons are lost. Question : sophisticated understanding of failure's causes and contexts will help to avoid the blame game and institute an effective strategy for learning from failure. Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories: preventable, complexity-related, and intelligent.

Which of the following statement (s) is/are true in the context of the given passage ? <br> I. Most executives believe that failure is bad and learning from it is pretty straightforward. <br> II. The wisdom of learning from failure is disputable. <br> III. Deliberate deviance, first on the list of the exhibit, "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure" obviously warrants blame.

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The wisdom of learning from failure is incontrovertible. Yet organisations that do it well are extraordinarily rare. This gap is not due to a lack of commitment to learning. Managers in the vast majority of enterprises that I have studied over the past 20 years -pharmaceutical. financial services, product design, telecommunications, and construction companies: hospitals; and NASA's space shuttle program, among others- genuinely wanted to help their organisations learn from failures to improve future performance. In some cases they and their teams had devoted many hours to afteraction reviews, postmortems, and the like. But time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change. The reason: Those managers were thinking about failure the wrong way. Most executives I've talked to believe that failure is bad (of course!). They also believe that learning from it is pretty straightforward: Ask people to reflect on what they did wrong and exhort them to avoid similar mistakes in the future-or, better yet, assign a team to review and write a report on what happened and then distribute it throughout the organisation. These widely held beliefs are misguided. First, failure is not always bad. In organisational life it is sometimes bad, sometimes inevitable, and sometimes even good. Second, learning from organisational failures is anything but straightforward. The attitudes and activities required to effectively detect and analyze failures are in short supply in most companies, and the need for context-specific learning strategies is underappreciated. Or - ganisations need new and better ways to go beyond lessons that are superficial ("Procedures weren't followed") or self-serving ("The market just wasn't ready for our great new product"). That means jettisoning old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success and embracing failure's lessons. Leaders can begin by understanding how the blame game gets in the way. The Blame Game Failure and fault are virtually inseparable in most households. organisations, and cultures. Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised. Executives I've interviewed in organisations as different as hospitals and investment banks admit to being torn: How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything-goes attitude? If people aren't blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try as hard as possible to do their best work? This concern is based on a false dichotomy. In actuality, a culture that makes it safe to admit and report on failure can-and in some organisational contexts must-coexist with high standards for performance. To understand why, look at the exhibit "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure," which lists causes ranging from deliberate deviation to thoughtful experimentation. Which of these causes involve blameworthy actions? Deliberate deviance, first on the list, obviously warrants blame. But inattention might not. If it results from a lack of effort, perhaps it's blameworthy. But if it results from fatigue near the end of an overly long shift, the manager who assigned the shift is more at fault than the employee. As we go down the list, it gets more and more difficult to find blameworthy acts. In fact, a failure resulting from thoughtful experimentation that generates valuable information may actually be praiseworthy. When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the failures in their organisations are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits-perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and their lessons are lost. Question : sophisticated understanding of failure's causes and contexts will help to avoid the blame game and institute an effective strategy for learning from failure. Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories: preventable, complexity-related, and intelligent.

Which of the following statements is not true in the context of the given passage ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The wisdom of learning from failure is incontrovertible. Yet organisations that do it well are extraordinarily rare. This gap is not due to a lack of commitment to learning. Managers in the vast majority of enterprises that I have studied over the past 20 years -pharmaceutical. financial services, product design, telecommunications, and construction companies: hospitals; and NASA's space shuttle program, among others- genuinely wanted to help their organisations learn from failures to improve future performance. In some cases they and their teams had devoted many hours to afteraction reviews, postmortems, and the like. But time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change. The reason: Those managers were thinking about failure the wrong way. Most executives I've talked to believe that failure is bad (of course!). They also believe that learning from it is pretty straightforward: Ask people to reflect on what they did wrong and exhort them to avoid similar mistakes in the future-or, better yet, assign a team to review and write a report on what happened and then distribute it throughout the organisation. These widely held beliefs are misguided. First, failure is not always bad. In organisational life it is sometimes bad, sometimes inevitable, and sometimes even good. Second, learning from organisational failures is anything but straightforward. The attitudes and activities required to effectively detect and analyze failures are in short supply in most companies, and the need for context-specific learning strategies is underappreciated. Or - ganisations need new and better ways to go beyond lessons that are superficial ("Procedures weren't followed") or self-serving ("The market just wasn't ready for our great new product"). That means jettisoning old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success and embracing failure's lessons. Leaders can begin by understanding how the blame game gets in the way. The Blame Game Failure and fault are virtually inseparable in most households. organisations, and cultures. Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised. Executives I've interviewed in organisations as different as hospitals and investment banks admit to being torn: How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything-goes attitude? If people aren't blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try as hard as possible to do their best work? This concern is based on a false dichotomy. In actuality, a culture that makes it safe to admit and report on failure can-and in some organisational contexts must-coexist with high standards for performance. To understand why, look at the exhibit "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure," which lists causes ranging from deliberate deviation to thoughtful experimentation. Which of these causes involve blameworthy actions? Deliberate deviance, first on the list, obviously warrants blame. But inattention might not. If it results from a lack of effort, perhaps it's blameworthy. But if it results from fatigue near the end of an overly long shift, the manager who assigned the shift is more at fault than the employee. As we go down the list, it gets more and more difficult to find blameworthy acts. In fact, a failure resulting from thoughtful experimentation that generates valuable information may actually be praiseworthy. When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the failures in their organisations are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits-perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and their lessons are lost. Question : sophisticated understanding of failure's causes and contexts will help to avoid the blame game and institute an effective strategy for learning from failure. Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories: preventable, complexity-related, and intelligent.

As opined by the writer of this article, although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories. What are these categories ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The wisdom of learning from failure is incontrovertible. Yet organisations that do it well are extraordinarily rare. This gap is not due to a lack of commitment to learning. Managers in the vast majority of enterprises that I have studied over the past 20 years -pharmaceutical. financial services, product design, telecommunications, and construction companies: hospitals; and NASA's space shuttle program, among others- genuinely wanted to help their organisations learn from failures to improve future performance. In some cases they and their teams had devoted many hours to afteraction reviews, postmortems, and the like. But time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change. The reason: Those managers were thinking about failure the wrong way. Most executives I've talked to believe that failure is bad (of course!). They also believe that learning from it is pretty straightforward: Ask people to reflect on what they did wrong and exhort them to avoid similar mistakes in the future-or, better yet, assign a team to review and write a report on what happened and then distribute it throughout the organisation. These widely held beliefs are misguided. First, failure is not always bad. In organisational life it is sometimes bad, sometimes inevitable, and sometimes even good. Second, learning from organisational failures is anything but straightforward. The attitudes and activities required to effectively detect and analyze failures are in short supply in most companies, and the need for context-specific learning strategies is underappreciated. Or - ganisations need new and better ways to go beyond lessons that are superficial ("Procedures weren't followed") or self-serving ("The market just wasn't ready for our great new product"). That means jettisoning old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success and embracing failure's lessons. Leaders can begin by understanding how the blame game gets in the way. The Blame Game Failure and fault are virtually inseparable in most households. organisations, and cultures. Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised. Executives I've interviewed in organisations as different as hospitals and investment banks admit to being torn: How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything-goes attitude? If people aren't blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try as hard as possible to do their best work? This concern is based on a false dichotomy. In actuality, a culture that makes it safe to admit and report on failure can-and in some organisational contexts must-coexist with high standards for performance. To understand why, look at the exhibit "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure," which lists causes ranging from deliberate deviation to thoughtful experimentation. Which of these causes involve blameworthy actions? Deliberate deviance, first on the list, obviously warrants blame. But inattention might not. If it results from a lack of effort, perhaps it's blameworthy. But if it results from fatigue near the end of an overly long shift, the manager who assigned the shift is more at fault than the employee. As we go down the list, it gets more and more difficult to find blameworthy acts. In fact, a failure resulting from thoughtful experimentation that generates valuable information may actually be praiseworthy. When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the failures in their organisations are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits-perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and their lessons are lost. Question : sophisticated understanding of failure's causes and contexts will help to avoid the blame game and institute an effective strategy for learning from failure. Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories: preventable, complexity-related, and intelligent.

Why have so few organisations shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The wisdom of learning from failure is incontrovertible. Yet organisations that do it well are extraordinarily rare. This gap is not due to a lack of commitment to learning. Managers in the vast majority of enterprises that I have studied over the past 20 years -pharmaceutical. financial services, product design, telecommunications, and construction companies: hospitals; and NASA's space shuttle program, among others- genuinely wanted to help their organisations learn from failures to improve future performance. In some cases they and their teams had devoted many hours to afteraction reviews, postmortems, and the like. But time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change. The reason: Those managers were thinking about failure the wrong way. Most executives I've talked to believe that failure is bad (of course!). They also believe that learning from it is pretty straightforward: Ask people to reflect on what they did wrong and exhort them to avoid similar mistakes in the future-or, better yet, assign a team to review and write a report on what happened and then distribute it throughout the organisation. These widely held beliefs are misguided. First, failure is not always bad. In organisational life it is sometimes bad, sometimes inevitable, and sometimes even good. Second, learning from organisational failures is anything but straightforward. The attitudes and activities required to effectively detect and analyze failures are in short supply in most companies, and the need for context-specific learning strategies is underappreciated. Or - ganisations need new and better ways to go beyond lessons that are superficial ("Procedures weren't followed") or self-serving ("The market just wasn't ready for our great new product"). That means jettisoning old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success and embracing failure's lessons. Leaders can begin by understanding how the blame game gets in the way. The Blame Game Failure and fault are virtually inseparable in most households. organisations, and cultures. Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised. Executives I've interviewed in organisations as different as hospitals and investment banks admit to being torn: How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything-goes attitude? If people aren't blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try as hard as possible to do their best work? This concern is based on a false dichotomy. In actuality, a culture that makes it safe to admit and report on failure can-and in some organisational contexts must-coexist with high standards for performance. To understand why, look at the exhibit "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure," which lists causes ranging from deliberate deviation to thoughtful experimentation. Which of these causes involve blameworthy actions? Deliberate deviance, first on the list, obviously warrants blame. But inattention might not. If it results from a lack of effort, perhaps it's blameworthy. But if it results from fatigue near the end of an overly long shift, the manager who assigned the shift is more at fault than the employee. As we go down the list, it gets more and more difficult to find blameworthy acts. In fact, a failure resulting from thoughtful experimentation that generates valuable information may actually be praiseworthy. When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the failures in their organisations are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits-perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and their lessons are lost. Question : sophisticated understanding of failure's causes and contexts will help to avoid the blame game and institute an effective strategy for learning from failure. Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories: preventable, complexity-related, and intelligent.

What in your opinion should be the most appropriate title of this passage ?

Choose the word/group of words which is most similar in meaning to the word /group of words printed in bold as used in the passage.

Exhort

Choose the word/group of words which is most similar in meaning to the word /group of words printed in bold as used in the passage.

Jettison

Choose the word/group of words which is most similar in meaning to the word /group of words printed in bold as used in the passage.

Dichotomy

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The wisdom of learning from failure is incontrovertible. Yet organisations that do it well are extraordinarily rare. This gap is not due to a lack of commitment to learning. Managers in the vast majority of enterprises that I have studied over the past 20 years -pharmaceutical. financial services, product design, telecommunications, and construction companies: hospitals; and NASA's space shuttle program, among others- genuinely wanted to help their organisations learn from failures to improve future performance. In some cases they and their teams had devoted many hours to afteraction reviews, postmortems, and the like. But time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change. The reason: Those managers were thinking about failure the wrong way. Most executives I've talked to believe that failure is bad (of course!). They also believe that learning from it is pretty straightforward: Ask people to reflect on what they did wrong and exhort them to avoid similar mistakes in the future-or, better yet, assign a team to review and write a report on what happened and then distribute it throughout the organisation. These widely held beliefs are misguided. First, failure is not always bad. In organisational life it is sometimes bad, sometimes inevitable, and sometimes even good. Second, learning from organisational failures is anything but straightforward. The attitudes and activities required to effectively detect and analyze failures are in short supply in most companies, and the need for context-specific learning strategies is underappreciated. Or - ganisations need new and better ways to go beyond lessons that are superficial ("Procedures weren't followed") or self-serving ("The market just wasn't ready for our great new product"). That means jettisoning old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success and embracing failure's lessons. Leaders can begin by understanding how the blame game gets in the way. The Blame Game Failure and fault are virtually inseparable in most households. organisations, and cultures. Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised. Executives I've interviewed in organisations as different as hospitals and investment banks admit to being torn: How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything-goes attitude? If people aren't blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try as hard as possible to do their best work? This concern is based on a false dichotomy. In actuality, a culture that makes it safe to admit and report on failure can-and in some organisational contexts must-coexist with high standards for performance. To understand why, look at the exhibit "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure," which lists causes ranging from deliberate deviation to thoughtful experimentation. Which of these causes involve blameworthy actions? Deliberate deviance, first on the list, obviously warrants blame. But inattention might not. If it results from a lack of effort, perhaps it's blameworthy. But if it results from fatigue near the end of an overly long shift, the manager who assigned the shift is more at fault than the employee. As we go down the list, it gets more and more difficult to find blameworthy acts. In fact, a failure resulting from thoughtful experimentation that generates valuable information may actually be praiseworthy. When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the failures in their organisations are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits-perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and their lessons are lost. Question : sophisticated understanding of failure's causes and contexts will help to avoid the blame game and institute an effective strategy for learning from failure. Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories: preventable, complexity-related, and intelligent.

Choose the word/group of words which is most opposite in meaning to the word/group of words printed in bold as used in the passage. <br> Incontrovertible

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The wisdom of learning from failure is incontrovertible. Yet organisations that do it well are extraordinarily rare. This gap is not due to a lack of commitment to learning. Managers in the vast majority of enterprises that I have studied over the past 20 years -pharmaceutical. financial services, product design, telecommunications, and construction companies: hospitals; and NASA's space shuttle program, among others- genuinely wanted to help their organisations learn from failures to improve future performance. In some cases they and their teams had devoted many hours to afteraction reviews, postmortems, and the like. But time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change. The reason: Those managers were thinking about failure the wrong way. Most executives I've talked to believe that failure is bad (of course!). They also believe that learning from it is pretty straightforward: Ask people to reflect on what they did wrong and exhort them to avoid similar mistakes in the future-or, better yet, assign a team to review and write a report on what happened and then distribute it throughout the organisation. These widely held beliefs are misguided. First, failure is not always bad. In organisational life it is sometimes bad, sometimes inevitable, and sometimes even good. Second, learning from organisational failures is anything but straightforward. The attitudes and activities required to effectively detect and analyze failures are in short supply in most companies, and the need for context-specific learning strategies is underappreciated. Or - ganisations need new and better ways to go beyond lessons that are superficial ("Procedures weren't followed") or self-serving ("The market just wasn't ready for our great new product"). That means jettisoning old cultural beliefs and stereotypical notions of success and embracing failure's lessons. Leaders can begin by understanding how the blame game gets in the way. The Blame Game Failure and fault are virtually inseparable in most households. organisations, and cultures. Every child learns at some point that admitting failure means taking the blame. That is why so few organisations have shifted to a culture of psychological safety in which the rewards of learning from failure can be fully realised. Executives I've interviewed in organisations as different as hospitals and investment banks admit to being torn: How can they respond constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything-goes attitude? If people aren't blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try as hard as possible to do their best work? This concern is based on a false dichotomy. In actuality, a culture that makes it safe to admit and report on failure can-and in some organisational contexts must-coexist with high standards for performance. To understand why, look at the exhibit "A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure," which lists causes ranging from deliberate deviation to thoughtful experimentation. Which of these causes involve blameworthy actions? Deliberate deviance, first on the list, obviously warrants blame. But inattention might not. If it results from a lack of effort, perhaps it's blameworthy. But if it results from fatigue near the end of an overly long shift, the manager who assigned the shift is more at fault than the employee. As we go down the list, it gets more and more difficult to find blameworthy acts. In fact, a failure resulting from thoughtful experimentation that generates valuable information may actually be praiseworthy. When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the failures in their organisations are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits-perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and their lessons are lost. Question : sophisticated understanding of failure's causes and contexts will help to avoid the blame game and institute an effective strategy for learning from failure. Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in organisations, mistakes fall into three broad categories: preventable, complexity-related, and intelligent.

Choose the word/group of words which is most opposite in meaning to the word/group of words printed in bold as used in the passage. <br> Overly

Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. <br> (A) Speculations , on future events in the epidemiology, evolution, and biological expression of dengue are presented. <br> (B) At the root of the emergence of dengue as a major health problem are changes in human demography and behavior, leading to unchecked populations of and increased exposure to the principal domestic mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti. Virus-specified factors also influence the epidemiology of dengue. <br> (C) The risk of sequential infections, and consequently the incidence of DHF, has risen dramatically, first in Asia and now in the Americas. <br> (D) A severe form, dengue hemorrhagic fever (DI-IF), is an immunopathologic disease occurring in persons who experience sequential dengue infections. <br> (E) In the last 20 years the incidence of dengue fever epidemics has increased and hyper-endemic transmission has been established over a geographically expanding area. <br> (F) Dengue viruses are members of the Flaviviridae, transmitted principally in a cycle involving humans and mosquito vectors.

Which of the following should be the First sentence after rearrangement ?

Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. <br> (A) Speculations , on future events in the epidemiology, evolution, and biological expression of dengue are presented. <br> (B) At the root of the emergence of dengue as a major health problem are changes in human demography and behavior, leading to unchecked populations of and increased exposure to the principal domestic mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti. Virus-specified factors also influence the epidemiology of dengue. <br> (C) The risk of sequential infections, and consequently the incidence of DHF, has risen dramatically, first in Asia and now in the Americas. <br> (D) A severe form, dengue hemorrhagic fever (DI-IF), is an immunopathologic disease occurring in persons who experience sequential dengue infections. <br> (E) In the last 20 years the incidence of dengue fever epidemics has increased and hyper-endemic transmission has been established over a geographically expanding area. <br> (F) Dengue viruses are members of the Flaviviridae, transmitted principally in a cycle involving humans and mosquito vectors.

Which of the following should be the Third sentence after rearrangement ?

Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. <br> (A) Speculations , on future events in the epidemiology, evolution, and biological expression of dengue are presented. <br> (B) At the root of the emergence of dengue as a major health problem are changes in human demography and behavior, leading to unchecked populations of and increased exposure to the principal domestic mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti. Virus-specified factors also influence the epidemiology of dengue. <br> (C) The risk of sequential infections, and consequently the incidence of DHF, has risen dramatically, first in Asia and now in the Americas. <br> (D) A severe form, dengue hemorrhagic fever (DI-IF), is an immunopathologic disease occurring in persons who experience sequential dengue infections. <br> (E) In the last 20 years the incidence of dengue fever epidemics has increased and hyper-endemic transmission has been established over a geographically expanding area. <br> (F) Dengue viruses are members of the Flaviviridae, transmitted principally in a cycle involving humans and mosquito vectors.

Which of the following should be the Last sentence after rearrangement ?

Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. <br> (A) Speculations , on future events in the epidemiology, evolution, and biological expression of dengue are presented. <br> (B) At the root of the emergence of dengue as a major health problem are changes in human demography and behavior, leading to unchecked populations of and increased exposure to the principal domestic mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti. Virus-specified factors also influence the epidemiology of dengue. <br> (C) The risk of sequential infections, and consequently the incidence of DHF, has risen dramatically, first in Asia and now in the Americas. <br> (D) A severe form, dengue hemorrhagic fever (DI-IF), is an immunopathologic disease occurring in persons who experience sequential dengue infections. <br> (E) In the last 20 years the incidence of dengue fever epidemics has increased and hyper-endemic transmission has been established over a geographically expanding area. <br> (F) Dengue viruses are members of the Flaviviridae, transmitted principally in a cycle involving humans and mosquito vectors.

Which of the following should be the Fourth sentence after rearrangement ?

Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. <br> (A) Speculations , on future events in the epidemiology, evolution, and biological expression of dengue are presented. <br> (B) At the root of the emergence of dengue as a major health problem are changes in human demography and behavior, leading to unchecked populations of and increased exposure to the principal domestic mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti. Virus-specified factors also influence the epidemiology of dengue. <br> (C) The risk of sequential infections, and consequently the incidence of DHF, has risen dramatically, first in Asia and now in the Americas. <br> (D) A severe form, dengue hemorrhagic fever (DI-IF), is an immunopathologic disease occurring in persons who experience sequential dengue infections. <br> (E) In the last 20 years the incidence of dengue fever epidemics has increased and hyper-endemic transmission has been established over a geographically expanding area. <br> (F) Dengue viruses are members of the Flaviviridae, transmitted principally in a cycle involving humans and mosquito vectors.

Which of the following should be the Second sentence after rearrangement ?

Each question below has two blanks, each blank indicating that something has been omitted. Choose the word for each blank which best fits the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

Manufacturing growth across Asia, Europe and the Americas eased in current month as heavy price cutting failed to revive , providing more evidence that a feeble global economic recovery may be to a halt.

Each question below has two blanks, each blank indicating that something has been omitted. Choose the word for each blank which best fits the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

Crude oil markets rose after a five year low rebounding after data suggested that tumbling prices may have started to affect activjty in the fast growing US shale oil industry

Each question below has two blanks, each blank indicating that something has been omitted. Choose the word for each blank which best fits the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

In fact, there is a strong case to promote liquor in high quality factories under regulation so that the of illicit liquor and hooch goes down.

Each question below has two blanks, each blank indicating that something has been omitted. Choose the word for each blank which best fits the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

The government ease foreign direct norms for the construction development sector , which is expected to provide a boost to the sector in terms of greater foreign capital inflows.

Each question below has two blanks, each blank indicating that something has been omitted. Choose the word for each blank which best fits the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

The banks were nationalised in to take banking to the country and all its citizens.

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Which of the following statements is not true in the context of the given passage ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Which of the following statement (s) is/are true in regard to the data compiled by the OECD ? <br> I. The 34 member countries of OECD had 2111 fully or majority owned stateowned enterprises (SOEs) <br> II. In these SOEs there were 5.9 million employees at the end of 2012. <br> III. The combined value of these SOEs is estimated at $ 2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry.

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Which of the following statements does not support the above mentioned view ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Which of the following statement(s) is/are true in the context of the given article ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

What should be the most appropriate title of the passage ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

In almost all the countries of- Europe, privatisation is to surprise. As expected by Mr. Christiansen, Which of the following is/are to be the main areas of activity ? <br> I. Resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms. transport and utilities. <br> II. The other area of growth should be in eastern Europe<br> III. The other area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis.

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Choose the word/group of words which is most similar in meaning to the word /group of words printed in bold as used in the passage. <br> Buoyant

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Choose the word/group of words which is most similar in meaning to the word /group of words printed in bold as used in the passage. <br> Revive

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Choose the word/group of words which is most opposite in meaning to the word/group of words printed in bold as used in the passage. <br> Benign

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. The past quarter of a century has seen several bursts of selling by the world's governments, mostly but not always in benign market conditions. Those in the OECD, a rich-country club, divested plenty of stuff in the 20 years before the global financial crisis. The first privatisation wave, which built up from the mid-1980s and peaked in 2000, was largely European. The drive to cut state intervention under Margaret Thatcher in Britain soon spread to the continent. The movement gathered pace after 1991, when eastern Europe put thousands of rusting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the block. A second wave came in the mid-2000s, as European economies sought to cash in on buoyant markets. But activity in OECD countries slowed sharply as the financial crisis began. In fact, it reversed. Bailouts of failing banks and companies have contributed to a dramatic increase in government purchases of corporate equity during the past five years. A more lasting fea ture is the expansion of the state capitalism practised by China and other emerging economic powers. Governments have actually bought more equity than they have sold in most years since 2007, though sales far exceeded purchases in 2013. Today privatisation is once again "alive and well", says William Megginson of the Michael Price College of Business at the University of Oklahoma. According to a global tally he recently completed, 2012 was the third-best year ever, and preliminary evidence suggests that 2013 may have been better. However, the geography of sell- offs has changed, with emerging markets now to the fore. China, for instance, has been selling minority stakes in banking, energy, engineering and broadcasting; Brazil is selling airports to help finance a $20 billion investment programme. Eleven of the 20 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2013 were sales of minority stakes by SOEs, mostly in developing countries. By contrast, state-owned assets are now "the forgotten side of the balance-sheet" in many advanced economies, says Dag Detter, managing partner of Whetstone Solutions, an adviser to governments on asset restructuring. They shouldn't be. Governments of OECD countries still oversee vast piles of assets, from banks and utilities to buildings, land and the riches beneath (see table). Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: reduce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often barely grasp the value locked up in them. The picture is clearest for companies or company-like entities held by central governments. According to data compiled by the OECD and published on its website, its 34 member countries had 2,111 fully or majority-owned SOEs, with 5.9m employees, at the end of 2012. Their combined value (allowing for some but not all pension-fund liabilities) is estimated at $2.2 trillion, roughly the same size as the global hedge-fund industry. Most are in network industries such as telecoms, electricity and transport. In addition, many countries have large minority stakes in listed firms. Those in which they hold a stake of between 10% and 50% have a combined market value of $890 billion and employ 2.9m people. <br><br> The data are far from perfect. The quality of reporting varies widely, as do definitions of what counts as a state-owned company: most include only centralgovernment holdings. If all assets held at sub-national level, such as local water companies, were included, the total value could be more than $4 trillion. Reckons Hans Christiansen, an OECD economist. Moreover, his team has had to extrapolate because some QECD members, including America and Japan, provide patchy data. America is apparently so queasy about discussions of public ownership of -commercial assets that the Treasury takes no part in the OECD's working group on the issue, even though it has vast holdings, from Amtrak and the 520,000-employee Postal Service to power generators and airports. The club's efforts to calculate the value that SOEs add to, or subtract from, economies were abandoned after several countries, including America, refused to co- operate. <br><br> Privatisation has begun picking up again recently in the OECD for a variety of reasons. Britain's Conservative-led coalition is fbcused on (some would say obsessed with) reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Having recently sold the Royal Mail through a public offering, it is hoping to offload other assets, including its stake in URENCO, a uranium enricher, and its student-loan portfolio. From January 8th, under a new Treasury scheme, members of the public and businesses will be allowed to buy government land and buildings on the open market. A website will shortly be set up to help potential buyers see which bits of the government's /..337 billion-worth of holdings ($527 billion at today's rate, accounting for 40% of developable sites round Britain) might be surplus. The government, said the chief treasury secretary, Danny Alexander, "should not act as some kind of compulsive hoarder". Japan has different reasons to revive sell- offs, such as to finance reconstruction after its devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Eyes are once again turning to Japan Post, a giant postal-to-financial-services conglomerate whose oftpostponed partial sale could at last happen in 2015 and raise (Yen) 4 trillion ($40 billion) or more. Australia wants to sell financial, postal and aviation assets to offset the fall in revenues caused by the commodities slowdown. In almost all the countries of Europe, privatisation is likely "to surprise on the upside" as long as markets continue to mend, reckons Mr Megginson. Mr Christiansen expects to see three main areas of activity in coming years. First will be the resumption of partial sell-offs in industries such as telecoms, transport and utilities. Many residual stakes in partly privatised firms could be sold down further. France, for instance, still has hefty stakes in GDF SUEZ, Renault, Thales and Orange. The government of Francois Hollande may be ideologically opposed to privatisation, but it is hoping to reduce industrial stakes to raise funds for livelier sectors, such as broadband and health. <br><br> The second area of growth should be in eastern Europe, where hundreds of large firms, including manufacturers, remain in state hands. Poland will sell down its stakes in listed firms to make up for an expected reduction in EU structural funds. And the third area is the reprivatisation of financial institutions rescued during the crisis. This process is under way: the largest privatisation in 2012 was the $18 billion offering of America's residual stake in AIG, an insurance company.

Choose the word/group of words which is most opposite in meaning to the word/group of words printed in bold as used in the passage. <br> Offload

In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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In the following passage there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested, one of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case. There is already an extensive empirical literature - often using growth accounts - that (31) these and other aspects of India's economic growth. Many of the studies (32) one or more of the following topics. First, a number of analysts (33) focused on characterizing India's economic performance at the most aggregate level. While there is agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers have reached vary ing conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.. There are on-going discussions over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by (34) it might be increased. Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors. A number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing - reaching a wide range of conflicting conclusions. However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), differences in the findings can be (35) to a variety of measurement issues, such as the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in manufacturing value added. Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that TFP growth in manufacturing (36) to have slowed in the post reform period - raising additional puzzles discussed below. However, (37,) difficulties in measuring employment within individual industries, our analysis focuses (38) on the broader industrial sector. The 3 studies that focus on India's services sector (many of which discuss the issue of sustain-ability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below (39) already well-known to those in the field. Nonethe-less, this paper seeks to make a contribution to that literature in a variety of ways. In particular, the growth accounting framework, com- bined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear to have been (40) recognized. Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent data revisions, some of which are quite large. They also provide new estimates for the contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors. Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of capital accumulation - providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for phystcal capital. Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections. The next section details the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the quality of the underlying data.

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