This is the Vocab24 daily quiz of 13 November 2025, the same 30 questions the app served that day, on the day's vocabulary and editorial. One mark for a right answer, minus 0.25 for a wrong one; the explanation opens as soon as you tap.
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Peppy
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Spunky
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Snug
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Dainty
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Breezy
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Adventitious
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Perseverate
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Dyspeptic
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
Lively, energetic, and cheerful; full of enthusiasm.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
Delicately small, pretty, and tasteful; refined and fragile.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
To repeat or continue a thought, action, or utterance long after it is appropriate or needed; to fixate and keep returning to the same point.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
Having a rough, scaly, or scabby surface; also dealing with indecent or scandalous matters; difficult or knotty.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
There aren't ____ people here.
Explanation: Option A is incorrect because ‘much’ is used before uncountable nouns or mass nouns. 'Many' is the correct choice as it is used to refer to a large number of countable noun. Option C is incorrect because ‘a lot’ is incomplete. It should have been ‘a lot of’. Option D is incorrect because ‘some’ is used in positive sentences.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
I'm ____ pleased with it.
Explanation: 'Much' is mainly used as an adjective, while 'very' is specifically used as an adverb. 'Much' and 'very' are two terms that are used often used to imply more or excess. However, the two terms differ in the manner that they are used. 'Much' is mainly used as an adjective, while 'very' is specifically used as an adverb. <br><br> As we already have an adjective 'pleased' we require an adverb which is 'very'.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
Urmila ____ move the bench.
Explanation: 'Urmila' which is noun can be followed by modal verbs while 'which', 'where', 'why' are used in interrogative sentences. Therefore 'could' is the correct answer.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
To take the bull by the horns
Explanation: To take the bull by the horns: To approach, confront, or deal with a problem or difficult situation directly and with clear, confident action.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
To take people by storm
Explanation: To take people by storm: To conquer, seize, or lay siege to something, someone, or some place with a sudden and furious attack.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
To take a leap in the dark
Explanation: To take a leap in the dark: something you do without being certain what will happen as a result.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the correct spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the correct spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the correct spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the correct spelling.
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
Score of authors have tried to demonstrate the the plays (a)/ we know as Shakespeare's were written by some other person, but no one, most critics agree, (b)/ has produced much positive evidence for this belief. (c)/ No error (d)
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
That Gitto's pointings are significant in the history of the early Renaissance, (a)/ but Gitto can not scarcely be considered the (b)/ equal of such matter as Leonardo and Raphael. (c)/ No error (d)
Explanation: omit 'can not' or 'scarcely'
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
Bismarck's distinctive quality was his methodical dedication to his (a)/ pre-determined goals, his refusal to be (b)/ detracted by secondary pursuits or concerns (c)/ No error (d)
Explanation: distracted instead of 'detracted'
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India–US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US–China relations and the enduring characteristics of US–Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo–Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India’s US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US–India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump’s victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo–American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump’s South Asia policy suggests that Delhi’s bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump’s basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US–Russia–China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi’s balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump’s likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), ‘China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process.’ Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America’s global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests—both material and ideational—in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following statements cannot be inferred from Paragraph 3?
Explanation: All the statements can easily be found in the paragraph. <br> India’s US policy is based on a large extent to its own balancing strategy along with the need for more stability in South Asian sub-continent with China too serving as a key factor. Also, with President Trump coming in, US’s India policy is in a state of uncertainty. <br> Lastly, the paragraph also mentions a shift of economic powers from West to East. <br> However, statement III is the opposite of what has been mentioned in the paragraph. <br> Hence Option C cannot be inferred.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India–US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US–China relations and the enduring characteristics of US–Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo–Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India’s US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US–India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump’s victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo–American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump’s South Asia policy suggests that Delhi’s bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump’s basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US–Russia–China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi’s balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump’s likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), ‘China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process.’ Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America’s global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests—both material and ideational—in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following sentences can be connected with Paragraph 4 to make a connection with Paragraph 5?
Explanation: Options A and C are related to economic growth only and do not fit in with the general tone of the two passages. <br> Option E presents the view that China’s ‘threat’ due to its rise is generally misinterpreted and will not pose a threat. <br> Option D too presents a similar view. <br> Both Options D and E are opposite the tone of the two passages. <br> Option B fits in perfectly. <br> Hence option B is correct.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India–US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US–China relations and the enduring characteristics of US–Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo–Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India’s US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US–India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump’s victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo–American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump’s South Asia policy suggests that Delhi’s bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump’s basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US–Russia–China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi’s balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump’s likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), ‘China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process.’ Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America’s global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests—both material and ideational—in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following sentence/s is commensurate the statement, ‘China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process’ as mentioned in Paragraph 6? <br> I. India, China and Russia must give up their independent national interests in favor of reverting back to America led unilateralism. <br> II. India, China and Russia must follow the tenets of Marxism as that would ensure the multi-polar world reaffirms the ideals of interdependence. <br> III. India, China and Russia can work in tandem to ensure a smooth transition to a polycentric world order leading to a new world order.
Explanation: Statement I is opposite to what has been stated and II are not mentioned anywhere in paragraph 6. <br> Statement III is clearly mentioned in lines 1 and 2. <br> Hence, option B is correct.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India–US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US–China relations and the enduring characteristics of US–Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo–Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India’s US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US–India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump’s victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo–American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump’s South Asia policy suggests that Delhi’s bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump’s basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US–Russia–China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi’s balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump’s likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), ‘China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process.’ Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America’s global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests—both material and ideational—in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following statements can be inferred from the passage? <br> I. Under the new regime, the US is turning ‘inwards’ where its priorities are changing from a predominance of geo-politics to giving prominence to the American citizens. <br> II. India foreign policy approach has been short sighted and did not see the need to include an alternative plan to US led unilateralism. <br> III. The post-unipolar world order involves a shift towards new forms of global governance, interdependence, economic order among others.
Explanation: Statement I is mentioned in paragraph 4, lines 2 and 3, statement II is mentioned in paragraph 1, lines 1 and 2 and statement III is mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6. <br> Hence, all options are true. <br> Thus, option E is correct.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India–US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US–China relations and the enduring characteristics of US–Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo–Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India’s US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US–India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump’s victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo–American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump’s South Asia policy suggests that Delhi’s bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump’s basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US–Russia–China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi’s balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump’s likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), ‘China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process.’ Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America’s global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests—both material and ideational—in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
What does the author mean by the statement, ‘leaving Delhi worse off than when it started’ as mentioned in Paragraph 2?
Explanation: Option A is mentioned in paragraph 2 sentence 1 and clearly states US’s complex relations with China and Pakistan. <br> Similarly option C also mentions how India US relations have led to less than desired results where each move by Delhi is countered by Beijing. <br> Option B is opposite to what has been mentioned and is incorrect. <br> Hence, option D is the correct answer.
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