This is the Vocab24 daily quiz of 14 September 2025, the same 30 questions the app served that day, on the day's vocabulary and editorial. One mark for a right answer, minus 0.25 for a wrong one; the explanation opens as soon as you tap.
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Invasion
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Consumption
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Emissions
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Accommodate
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Probably
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Complex
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Retaliating
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Imposed
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
An instance of invading a country or region with an armed force.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
The ability to influence situations or people so that you can control what happens.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
Consisting of many different and connected parts.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
To make a law, rule, opinion, etc. be accepted by using your power or authority.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
Would you mind ____ the suitcase, Sir?
Explanation: When a Subject is not mentioned, Verb + ing is used. <br> Look at the sentence : Would you mind preparing a cup of tea for me? <br> Here, 'opening' is the right usage.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
Who spilled ____ tea on the floor?
Explanation: The definite article (the) is used before a noun to indicate that the identity of the noun is known to the reader. The indefinite article (a, an) is used before a noun that is general or when its identity is not known. Hence here 'the' will be used.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
His office is ____ the second floor of the building.
Explanation: A preposition is a word which comes before a noun or a pronoun and establishes a relationship between the elements of a clause or words. Option D on is correct as it indicates a surface. The other options are wrong as at, in, and of indicate a specific location inside something, and possession respectively. These uses don't fit in the given question.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
He is an interesting speaker but tends to go off at a tangent.
Explanation: go off at a tangent: to suddenly start talking or thinking about a completely new subject.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
He sold his house for a song.
Explanation: for a song: for little money.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
Despite the trust bestowed on the minister he turned out to be a snake in the grass during the revolution.
Explanation: The idiom 'a snake in the grass' refers to someone who appears to be friendly or harmless but is actually a hidden enemy or traitor. <br> Let's look at the options: <br> Option A: a secret enemy - This is a good description of someone who is a 'snake in the grass.' They are not openly hostile, but secretly work against you. <br> Option B: a treacherous person - This is also a very accurate description. 'Treacherous' means someone who betrays trust, which is exactly what a snake in the grass does. <br> Option C: an unforeseen danger - While a snake in the grass *can* present an unforeseen danger, the idiom specifically refers to the person, not just the danger itself. <br> Option D: an unexpected misfortune - This is a general negative event and doesn't capture the element of betrayal inherent in the idiom. <br> Between A and B, both are good. However, option B, 'a treacherous person,' is slightly better because it emphasizes the betrayal aspect which is central to the 'snake in the grass' meaning. <br> So, Option B is the best answer because it accurately captures the meaning of the idiom as a person who betrays trust after seeming friendly. Option A is also close, but 'treacherous' is a stronger fit.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
(a) The technician reminded/ (b) them to have a/ (c) thoroughly cleaning of the machine after each use./ (d) No error.
Explanation: thorough
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
a) If I were / (b) in his shoes/ (c) I would die with shame./ (d) No error.
Explanation: would have died
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
(a) Even many people/ (b) carry an infection/ (c) without showing its symptoms./ (d) No error.
Explanation: Though many
Directions: Read the following passage to answer the given questions based on it. Some words/phrases are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. <br> <br> Ever since the morning after 26/11, India's strategic community has discussed what the country ought to do when the next 26/11 happens. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have to answer that question sooner than most people expect. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) staged its first operation against an Indian target since 26/11 just hours before Mr. Modi took office, attacking India's mission in Herat. Lashkar chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed blamed Mr. Modi for this week's attacks on Karachi - and demanded vengeance. <br> <br> From past evidence, we know these threats aren't idle. 'The only language India understands is that of force,' a press release issued by the Lashkar's parent organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa recorded Mr. Saeed as saying before 26/11, 'and that is the language it must be talked to in.' <br> <br> From files he will have read since taking office, Mr. Modi will have learned why Dr. Singh did nothing. Indian combat jets could hit training camps across the Line of Control (LoC), Air Chief Marshal Fali Major said at a November 29 meeting called for by the Prime Minister, but precise coordinates and adequate imaging weren't available. Later, General Deepak Kapoor, the chief of Army staff, told Dr. Singh he couldn't promise special forces' strikes would be successful either. <br> <br> No one could guarantee missile strikes wouldn't escalate into war, or even a nuclear exchange - and no one could guarantee war would compel Pakistan's military to change course. <br><br> Mr. Modi's advisers know five responses are on the table - but all of them involve great risks. The first is to keep doing nothing. The threat of a major IndiaPakistan crisis after 26/11 led the United States to mount intense pressure on Pakistan. In the years since, the LeT hasn't mounted a single major operation on Indian soil. Its affiliate, the Indian Mujahideen, has had restraint thrust upon it by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. <br><br> Inaction, though, only succeeds if someone else does the hard work. In 2008, fearing its own war in Afghanistan would be undermined by an India-Pakistan war, the U.S. stepped in. Now, as it prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, the country's appetite for playing global policeman is diminishing. Doing nothing could thus invite even more punishment. <br><br> Like Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mr. Modi's second choice might be coercion. In 2001, after terrorists attacked Parliament, India mobilised troops. Pakistan was forced to respond - but its smaller economy suffered disproportionately. The stratagem is time-tested. In 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru mobilised troops in Punjab to deter a Pakistani attack into Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Vajpayee's strategy worked, forcing Pakistan to dramatically scale down the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. It only worked, though, because the U.S. played mediator - much like after 26/11 - and it was hideously expensive, in money and lives. <br><br> The third choice is to do what Dr. Singh couldn't: limited strikes on jihadist training camps across the LoC, using air power or missiles. In the five years since 26/11, India's ability to conduct such strikes has been significantly enhanced. However, the tactic hasn't had great success. In August 1998, the United States fired missiles into Afghanistan, seeking to avenge bombings which killed 224 people. In all, 75 missiles, each priced at $1.5 million, killed six minor jihadists. Moreover, Pakistan could hit back, targeting Indian industrial infrastructure, which is much more expensive than tent-and-donkey cart training camps. <br><br> Fourth, the Prime Minister could tell Indian troops to target the Pakistan Army along the LoC, using artillery and infantry - a task aided by the fact that its defences along stretches of the Neelam valley have been degraded by troops having to be moved to fight the Tehreek-e-Taliban elsewhere. The fighting that will follow though will make it more difficult to secure the LoC against jihadist infiltration - leading to heightened violence in Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Modi could, finally, authorise the use of covert means, like bomb-for-bomb strikes or targeted assassination of jihadist leaders. Mr. Modi's intelligence services, though, don't have this arrow in their quiver - and it will be a while, most experts say, before they can acquire it. <br><br> Every sane person should hope Mr. Modi will never be required to exercise any of his military options - but thinking through war is just as important as talking peace.
What is the major reason according to the passage is for the Lashkar-e-Taiba not mounting a major operation on Indian soil after 26/11?
Explanation: Kindly refer to the 3rd and 4th sentences of the 5th paragraph.
Directions: Read the following passage to answer the given questions based on it. Some words/phrases are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. <br> <br> Ever since the morning after 26/11, India's strategic community has discussed what the country ought to do when the next 26/11 happens. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have to answer that question sooner than most people expect. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) staged its first operation against an Indian target since 26/11 just hours before Mr. Modi took office, attacking India's mission in Herat. Lashkar chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed blamed Mr. Modi for this week's attacks on Karachi - and demanded vengeance. <br> <br> From past evidence, we know these threats aren't idle. 'The only language India understands is that of force,' a press release issued by the Lashkar's parent organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa recorded Mr. Saeed as saying before 26/11, 'and that is the language it must be talked to in.' <br> <br> From files he will have read since taking office, Mr. Modi will have learned why Dr. Singh did nothing. Indian combat jets could hit training camps across the Line of Control (LoC), Air Chief Marshal Fali Major said at a November 29 meeting called for by the Prime Minister, but precise coordinates and adequate imaging weren't available. Later, General Deepak Kapoor, the chief of Army staff, told Dr. Singh he couldn't promise special forces' strikes would be successful either. <br> <br> No one could guarantee missile strikes wouldn't escalate into war, or even a nuclear exchange - and no one could guarantee war would compel Pakistan's military to change course. <br><br> Mr. Modi's advisers know five responses are on the table - but all of them involve great risks. The first is to keep doing nothing. The threat of a major IndiaPakistan crisis after 26/11 led the United States to mount intense pressure on Pakistan. In the years since, the LeT hasn't mounted a single major operation on Indian soil. Its affiliate, the Indian Mujahideen, has had restraint thrust upon it by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. <br><br> Inaction, though, only succeeds if someone else does the hard work. In 2008, fearing its own war in Afghanistan would be undermined by an India-Pakistan war, the U.S. stepped in. Now, as it prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, the country's appetite for playing global policeman is diminishing. Doing nothing could thus invite even more punishment. <br><br> Like Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mr. Modi's second choice might be coercion. In 2001, after terrorists attacked Parliament, India mobilised troops. Pakistan was forced to respond - but its smaller economy suffered disproportionately. The stratagem is time-tested. In 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru mobilised troops in Punjab to deter a Pakistani attack into Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Vajpayee's strategy worked, forcing Pakistan to dramatically scale down the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. It only worked, though, because the U.S. played mediator - much like after 26/11 - and it was hideously expensive, in money and lives. <br><br> The third choice is to do what Dr. Singh couldn't: limited strikes on jihadist training camps across the LoC, using air power or missiles. In the five years since 26/11, India's ability to conduct such strikes has been significantly enhanced. However, the tactic hasn't had great success. In August 1998, the United States fired missiles into Afghanistan, seeking to avenge bombings which killed 224 people. In all, 75 missiles, each priced at $1.5 million, killed six minor jihadists. Moreover, Pakistan could hit back, targeting Indian industrial infrastructure, which is much more expensive than tent-and-donkey cart training camps. <br><br> Fourth, the Prime Minister could tell Indian troops to target the Pakistan Army along the LoC, using artillery and infantry - a task aided by the fact that its defences along stretches of the Neelam valley have been degraded by troops having to be moved to fight the Tehreek-e-Taliban elsewhere. The fighting that will follow though will make it more difficult to secure the LoC against jihadist infiltration - leading to heightened violence in Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Modi could, finally, authorise the use of covert means, like bomb-for-bomb strikes or targeted assassination of jihadist leaders. Mr. Modi's intelligence services, though, don't have this arrow in their quiver - and it will be a while, most experts say, before they can acquire it. <br><br> Every sane person should hope Mr. Modi will never be required to exercise any of his military options - but thinking through war is just as important as talking peace.
Which of the following statements according to the passage is not true?
Explanation: The answer can easily be inferred from the 7th paragraph.
Directions: Read the following passage to answer the given questions based on it. Some words/phrases are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. <br> <br> Ever since the morning after 26/11, India's strategic community has discussed what the country ought to do when the next 26/11 happens. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have to answer that question sooner than most people expect. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) staged its first operation against an Indian target since 26/11 just hours before Mr. Modi took office, attacking India's mission in Herat. Lashkar chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed blamed Mr. Modi for this week's attacks on Karachi - and demanded vengeance. <br> <br> From past evidence, we know these threats aren't idle. 'The only language India understands is that of force,' a press release issued by the Lashkar's parent organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa recorded Mr. Saeed as saying before 26/11, 'and that is the language it must be talked to in.' <br> <br> From files he will have read since taking office, Mr. Modi will have learned why Dr. Singh did nothing. Indian combat jets could hit training camps across the Line of Control (LoC), Air Chief Marshal Fali Major said at a November 29 meeting called for by the Prime Minister, but precise coordinates and adequate imaging weren't available. Later, General Deepak Kapoor, the chief of Army staff, told Dr. Singh he couldn't promise special forces' strikes would be successful either. <br> <br> No one could guarantee missile strikes wouldn't escalate into war, or even a nuclear exchange - and no one could guarantee war would compel Pakistan's military to change course. <br><br> Mr. Modi's advisers know five responses are on the table - but all of them involve great risks. The first is to keep doing nothing. The threat of a major IndiaPakistan crisis after 26/11 led the United States to mount intense pressure on Pakistan. In the years since, the LeT hasn't mounted a single major operation on Indian soil. Its affiliate, the Indian Mujahideen, has had restraint thrust upon it by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. <br><br> Inaction, though, only succeeds if someone else does the hard work. In 2008, fearing its own war in Afghanistan would be undermined by an India-Pakistan war, the U.S. stepped in. Now, as it prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, the country's appetite for playing global policeman is diminishing. Doing nothing could thus invite even more punishment. <br><br> Like Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mr. Modi's second choice might be coercion. In 2001, after terrorists attacked Parliament, India mobilised troops. Pakistan was forced to respond - but its smaller economy suffered disproportionately. The stratagem is time-tested. In 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru mobilised troops in Punjab to deter a Pakistani attack into Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Vajpayee's strategy worked, forcing Pakistan to dramatically scale down the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. It only worked, though, because the U.S. played mediator - much like after 26/11 - and it was hideously expensive, in money and lives. <br><br> The third choice is to do what Dr. Singh couldn't: limited strikes on jihadist training camps across the LoC, using air power or missiles. In the five years since 26/11, India's ability to conduct such strikes has been significantly enhanced. However, the tactic hasn't had great success. In August 1998, the United States fired missiles into Afghanistan, seeking to avenge bombings which killed 224 people. In all, 75 missiles, each priced at $1.5 million, killed six minor jihadists. Moreover, Pakistan could hit back, targeting Indian industrial infrastructure, which is much more expensive than tent-and-donkey cart training camps. <br><br> Fourth, the Prime Minister could tell Indian troops to target the Pakistan Army along the LoC, using artillery and infantry - a task aided by the fact that its defences along stretches of the Neelam valley have been degraded by troops having to be moved to fight the Tehreek-e-Taliban elsewhere. The fighting that will follow though will make it more difficult to secure the LoC against jihadist infiltration - leading to heightened violence in Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Modi could, finally, authorise the use of covert means, like bomb-for-bomb strikes or targeted assassination of jihadist leaders. Mr. Modi's intelligence services, though, don't have this arrow in their quiver - and it will be a while, most experts say, before they can acquire it. <br><br> Every sane person should hope Mr. Modi will never be required to exercise any of his military options - but thinking through war is just as important as talking peace.
What according to the passage could be a way to respond to Pakistan after 26/11 attacks? <br> I. To persuade Pakistan forcefully to stop the terror acts on India. <br> II. To launch limited strikes on jihadist training camps across the border. <br> III. To target assassination of jihadist leaders.
Explanation: Kindly refer to the 7th, 9th and 11th paragraphs of the passage.
Directions: Read the following passage to answer the given questions based on it. Some words/phrases are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. <br> <br> Ever since the morning after 26/11, India's strategic community has discussed what the country ought to do when the next 26/11 happens. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have to answer that question sooner than most people expect. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) staged its first operation against an Indian target since 26/11 just hours before Mr. Modi took office, attacking India's mission in Herat. Lashkar chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed blamed Mr. Modi for this week's attacks on Karachi - and demanded vengeance. <br> <br> From past evidence, we know these threats aren't idle. 'The only language India understands is that of force,' a press release issued by the Lashkar's parent organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa recorded Mr. Saeed as saying before 26/11, 'and that is the language it must be talked to in.' <br> <br> From files he will have read since taking office, Mr. Modi will have learned why Dr. Singh did nothing. Indian combat jets could hit training camps across the Line of Control (LoC), Air Chief Marshal Fali Major said at a November 29 meeting called for by the Prime Minister, but precise coordinates and adequate imaging weren't available. Later, General Deepak Kapoor, the chief of Army staff, told Dr. Singh he couldn't promise special forces' strikes would be successful either. <br> <br> No one could guarantee missile strikes wouldn't escalate into war, or even a nuclear exchange - and no one could guarantee war would compel Pakistan's military to change course. <br><br> Mr. Modi's advisers know five responses are on the table - but all of them involve great risks. The first is to keep doing nothing. The threat of a major IndiaPakistan crisis after 26/11 led the United States to mount intense pressure on Pakistan. In the years since, the LeT hasn't mounted a single major operation on Indian soil. Its affiliate, the Indian Mujahideen, has had restraint thrust upon it by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. <br><br> Inaction, though, only succeeds if someone else does the hard work. In 2008, fearing its own war in Afghanistan would be undermined by an India-Pakistan war, the U.S. stepped in. Now, as it prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, the country's appetite for playing global policeman is diminishing. Doing nothing could thus invite even more punishment. <br><br> Like Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mr. Modi's second choice might be coercion. In 2001, after terrorists attacked Parliament, India mobilised troops. Pakistan was forced to respond - but its smaller economy suffered disproportionately. The stratagem is time-tested. In 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru mobilised troops in Punjab to deter a Pakistani attack into Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Vajpayee's strategy worked, forcing Pakistan to dramatically scale down the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. It only worked, though, because the U.S. played mediator - much like after 26/11 - and it was hideously expensive, in money and lives. <br><br> The third choice is to do what Dr. Singh couldn't: limited strikes on jihadist training camps across the LoC, using air power or missiles. In the five years since 26/11, India's ability to conduct such strikes has been significantly enhanced. However, the tactic hasn't had great success. In August 1998, the United States fired missiles into Afghanistan, seeking to avenge bombings which killed 224 people. In all, 75 missiles, each priced at $1.5 million, killed six minor jihadists. Moreover, Pakistan could hit back, targeting Indian industrial infrastructure, which is much more expensive than tent-and-donkey cart training camps. <br><br> Fourth, the Prime Minister could tell Indian troops to target the Pakistan Army along the LoC, using artillery and infantry - a task aided by the fact that its defences along stretches of the Neelam valley have been degraded by troops having to be moved to fight the Tehreek-e-Taliban elsewhere. The fighting that will follow though will make it more difficult to secure the LoC against jihadist infiltration - leading to heightened violence in Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Modi could, finally, authorise the use of covert means, like bomb-for-bomb strikes or targeted assassination of jihadist leaders. Mr. Modi's intelligence services, though, don't have this arrow in their quiver - and it will be a while, most experts say, before they can acquire it. <br><br> Every sane person should hope Mr. Modi will never be required to exercise any of his military options - but thinking through war is just as important as talking peace.
Which of the following statements according to the passage is true?
Explanation: The writer in the passage clearly states 5 responses that can be acted upon if Pakistan attacks India in future. The writer also talks about prospects and consequences of every response India resorts to. <br> The option B, hence, is correct.
Directions: Read the following passage to answer the given questions based on it. Some words/phrases are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. <br> <br> Ever since the morning after 26/11, India's strategic community has discussed what the country ought to do when the next 26/11 happens. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have to answer that question sooner than most people expect. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) staged its first operation against an Indian target since 26/11 just hours before Mr. Modi took office, attacking India's mission in Herat. Lashkar chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed blamed Mr. Modi for this week's attacks on Karachi - and demanded vengeance. <br> <br> From past evidence, we know these threats aren't idle. 'The only language India understands is that of force,' a press release issued by the Lashkar's parent organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa recorded Mr. Saeed as saying before 26/11, 'and that is the language it must be talked to in.' <br> <br> From files he will have read since taking office, Mr. Modi will have learned why Dr. Singh did nothing. Indian combat jets could hit training camps across the Line of Control (LoC), Air Chief Marshal Fali Major said at a November 29 meeting called for by the Prime Minister, but precise coordinates and adequate imaging weren't available. Later, General Deepak Kapoor, the chief of Army staff, told Dr. Singh he couldn't promise special forces' strikes would be successful either. <br> <br> No one could guarantee missile strikes wouldn't escalate into war, or even a nuclear exchange - and no one could guarantee war would compel Pakistan's military to change course. <br><br> Mr. Modi's advisers know five responses are on the table - but all of them involve great risks. The first is to keep doing nothing. The threat of a major IndiaPakistan crisis after 26/11 led the United States to mount intense pressure on Pakistan. In the years since, the LeT hasn't mounted a single major operation on Indian soil. Its affiliate, the Indian Mujahideen, has had restraint thrust upon it by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. <br><br> Inaction, though, only succeeds if someone else does the hard work. In 2008, fearing its own war in Afghanistan would be undermined by an India-Pakistan war, the U.S. stepped in. Now, as it prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, the country's appetite for playing global policeman is diminishing. Doing nothing could thus invite even more punishment. <br><br> Like Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mr. Modi's second choice might be coercion. In 2001, after terrorists attacked Parliament, India mobilised troops. Pakistan was forced to respond - but its smaller economy suffered disproportionately. The stratagem is time-tested. In 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru mobilised troops in Punjab to deter a Pakistani attack into Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Vajpayee's strategy worked, forcing Pakistan to dramatically scale down the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. It only worked, though, because the U.S. played mediator - much like after 26/11 - and it was hideously expensive, in money and lives. <br><br> The third choice is to do what Dr. Singh couldn't: limited strikes on jihadist training camps across the LoC, using air power or missiles. In the five years since 26/11, India's ability to conduct such strikes has been significantly enhanced. However, the tactic hasn't had great success. In August 1998, the United States fired missiles into Afghanistan, seeking to avenge bombings which killed 224 people. In all, 75 missiles, each priced at $1.5 million, killed six minor jihadists. Moreover, Pakistan could hit back, targeting Indian industrial infrastructure, which is much more expensive than tent-and-donkey cart training camps. <br><br> Fourth, the Prime Minister could tell Indian troops to target the Pakistan Army along the LoC, using artillery and infantry - a task aided by the fact that its defences along stretches of the Neelam valley have been degraded by troops having to be moved to fight the Tehreek-e-Taliban elsewhere. The fighting that will follow though will make it more difficult to secure the LoC against jihadist infiltration - leading to heightened violence in Kashmir. <br><br> Mr. Modi could, finally, authorise the use of covert means, like bomb-for-bomb strikes or targeted assassination of jihadist leaders. Mr. Modi's intelligence services, though, don't have this arrow in their quiver - and it will be a while, most experts say, before they can acquire it. <br><br> Every sane person should hope Mr. Modi will never be required to exercise any of his military options - but thinking through war is just as important as talking peace.
What could be an appropriate title of the passage?
Explanation: As explained in the explanation part of the previous question, option B can be chosen as an appropriate title of the passage.
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