This is the Vocab24 daily quiz of 10 May 2025, the same 30 questions the app served that day, on the day's vocabulary and editorial. One mark for a right answer, minus 0.25 for a wrong one; the explanation opens as soon as you tap.
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Prevalent
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Avert
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Vast
Out of the given alternatives select the alternative which best expresses the meaning of given word.
Desperate
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Merely
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Starvation
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Frequently
Out of the given alternatives select the word opposite in meaning to the given word.
Exhausted
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
To prevent something bad from happening.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
Feeling or showing a hopeless sense that a situation is so bad as to be impossible to deal with.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
Suffering or death caused by lack of food.
Out of given alternatives, choose the word which can be substituted for the given words/ sentence.
The action of forcibly taking someone away against their will, typically to hold them captive.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
Look, It ____
Explanation: We use 'am', 'are', 'is' + the -ing form of the verb with present continuous tense. 'Look' word suggest the sentence to be in present form.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
He would ____ beg than steal.
Explanation: 'Rather' is an adverb used to indicate what you want or prefer to do, have, etc.<br> Example: She would rather drive than take the train.
A statement with one blank is given below. Choose the set of words from the given options which can be used to fill the given blank.
Don't worry, I will stand ____ you if you get into trouble.
Explanation: 'Stand for' means to defend or support a particular idea or a person who is being criticized or attacked.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
To ride hell for Leather
Explanation: To ride hell for Leather: Very quickly or as quickly as possible.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
The boy turned a deaf ear to the pleadings of all his well-wishers.
Explanation: Turned a deaf ear: refuse to listen or respond to a statement or request.
Out of given alternatives select the option which best expresses the meaning of given idiom/ phrase.
I am ambitious and never want to rest on my laurels.
Explanation: Rest on my laurels: be so satisfied with what one has already done or achieved that one makes no further effort.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Out of given alternatives select the word which is correctly spelt.
Choose the Correct Spelling.
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
As one of the leader (a) of insurance companies in India they offer (b)/ comprehensive financial services. (c)/ No error (d)
Explanation: the leaders
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
There is a rumour that this multinational company will (a)/ set up its regional headquarters (b) in India in short (c)/ No error (d)
Explanation: in India soon
Which of phrases given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold type to make the grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, mark 'd' as the answer.
Despite taking steps to encourage foreign investment (a)/ there has been any (b) / substantial improvement in our economy (c)/ No error (d)
Explanation: has been no
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India-US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US-China relations and the enduring characteristics of US-Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo-Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India's US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US-India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump's victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo-American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump's South Asia policy suggests that Delhi's bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump's basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US-Russia-China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi's balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump's likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), "China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process." Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America's global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests-both material and ideational-in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following statements cannot be inferred from Paragraph 3?
Explanation: All the statements can easily be found in the paragraph. <br><br> India's US policy is based on a large extent to its own balancing strategy along with the need for more stability in South Asian sub-continent with China too serving as a key factor. Also, with President Trump coming in, US's India policy is in a state of uncertainty. <br><br> Lastly, the paragraph also mentions a shift of economic powers from West to East. <br><br> However, statement III is the opposite of what has been mentioned in the paragraph. <br><br> Hence Option C cannot be inferred.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India-US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US-China relations and the enduring characteristics of US-Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo-Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India's US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US-India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump's victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo-American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump's South Asia policy suggests that Delhi's bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump's basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US-Russia-China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi's balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump's likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), "China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process." Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America's global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests-both material and ideational-in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following sentences can be connected with Paragraph 4 to make a connection with Paragraph 5?
Explanation: Options A and C are related to economic growth only and do not fit in with the general tone of the two passages. <br> Option E presents the view that China's 'threat' due to its rise is generally misinterpreted and will not pose a threat. <br> Option D too presents a similar view. <br> Both Options D and E are opposite the tone of the two passages. <br> Option B fits in perfectly. <br> Hence option B is correct.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India-US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US-China relations and the enduring characteristics of US-Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo-Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India's US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US-India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump's victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo-American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump's South Asia policy suggests that Delhi's bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump's basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US-Russia-China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi's balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump's likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), "China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process." Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America's global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests-both material and ideational-in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following sentence/s is commensurate the statement, "China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process" as mentioned in Paragraph 6? <br> I. India, China and Russia must give up their independent national interests in favor of reverting back to America led unilateralism. <br> II. India, China and Russia must follow the tenets of Marxism as that would ensure the multi-polar world reaffirms the ideals of interdependence. <br> III. India, China and Russia can work in tandem to ensure a smooth transition to a polycentric world order leading to a new world order.
Explanation: Statement I is opposite to what has been stated and II are not mentioned anywhere in paragraph 6. <br> Statement III is clearly mentioned in lines 1 and 2. <br> Hence, option B is correct.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India-US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US-China relations and the enduring characteristics of US-Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo-Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India's US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US-India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump's victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo-American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump's South Asia policy suggests that Delhi's bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump's basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US-Russia-China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi's balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump's likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), "China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process." Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America's global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests-both material and ideational-in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
Which of the following statements can be inferred from the passage? <br> I. Under the new regime, the US is turning 'inwards' where its priorities are changing from a predominance of geo-politics to giving prominence to the American citizens. <br> II. India foreign policy approach has been short sighted and did not see the need to include an alternative plan to US led unilateralism. <br> III. The post-unipolar world order involves a shift towards new forms of global governance, interdependence, economic order among others.
Explanation: Statement I is mentioned in paragraph 4, lines 2 and 3, statement II is mentioned in paragraph 1, lines 1 and 2 and statement III is mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6. <br> Hence, all options are true. <br> Thus, option E is correct.
Direction: Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below. <br><br> Paragraph1. Unlike Russia and China, who have sought to reform and even transform the US-led order, India has been quite content to integrate with the post-1991 order, albeit with perfunctory reforms. Consequently, neither was a post-unipolar world imagined, nor its contours fathomed. Operating under The comforting assumption of prolonged US preponderance, much of contemporary statecraft and geo-strategies have been formulated under such a world view. And, nothing has shaped India-US ties more than the rise of China. <br><br> Paragraph 2. But, this shared threat perception has always found itself at odds with the complex reality of US-China relations and the enduring characteristics of US-Pakistan relations. An optimistic framework for an Indian balance-of-power strategy has relied on a hypothesized replay of the old Indo-Soviet congruence in Asia and the subcontinent. Yet, unlike the old Cold War geo-strategy that was underpinned by leveraging fundamental cleavages in the international and regional systems, India's US play has been crafted upon a more complex geopolitical landscape, yielding paradoxical outcomes. For instance, each successive China move with the US by Delhi has precipitated a proportional Pakistan and sub-continental countermove by Beijing. Significantly, most of these moves by China have not been de?ected by the US-India partnership, leaving Delhi worse off than when it started. <br><br> Paragraph 3. Until Trump's victory, Delhi had been willing to absorb the costs. Perhaps, the premise was that a more enduring Indo-American strategic partnership would ultimately emerge to stabilize the sub-regional environment as well as provide options to bargain with China. The uncertainty around Trump's South Asia policy suggests that Delhi's bold policy is now even more of a gamble. Trump's basic impulse to stabilize the great power setting of US-Russia-China, as well as a reluctance to heighten competition in non-core regions like the subcontinent will further complicate Delhi's balancing strategies, even if Washington maintains general continuity on its India policy. Beyond geopolitics, the shifting fulcrum of economic globalization from the West to the East will again challenge the dominant assumptions of the past two decades. <br><br> Paragraph 4. Curiously, unlike in China, Indian policymakers have not engaged in serious debates about the post-2008 global economy. Trump's likely displacement of the old geoeconomic approach (where the US evaluated economic choices through its global ambitions) towards a more national and allied-centered economic strategy (prioritizing socio-economic stability and the American middle class over ambitious geopolitics) will compel Delhi to muddle its way towards a changing economic order. <br><br> Paragraph 5. While all three would naturally frame and pursue their policy goals based on their intramural and regional contexts, the window for order-building and contribution to global governance by the non-Western world has been jarred open. As Dmitri Trenin recently suggested in the Global Times (22 February 2017), "China, India and Russia can build a core group to lead the order-building process." Not only are there possibilities for in?uencing the orderly re-orientation of America's global role, there is a necessity to stabilize the transition and channel the world order in more sustainable directions. <br><br> Paragraph 6. A central question for all three states is as to how they can ensure that a multipolar world retains elements of interdependence and multilateralism. As each have independent national interests-both material and ideational-in promoting such a polycentric order, the policy and academic discourse ought to now thoughtfully examine the diverse pathways that could be charted by Eurasia to promote regional and global stability.
What does the author mean by the statement, "leaving Delhi worse off than when it started" as mentioned in Paragraph 2?
Explanation: Option A is mentioned in paragraph 2 sentence 1 and clearly states US's complex relations with China and Pakistan. <br> Similarly option C also mentions how India US relations have led to less than desired results where each move by Delhi is countered by Beijing. <br> Option B is opposite to what has been mentioned and is incorrect. <br> Hence, option D is the correct answer.
One Prime for the website and the app, same login. Videos play in the app.
30 questions in 15 minutes, All India rank, streak and explanations. Free: play it here after logging in, or in the app.
Free, and no password to remember.
By continuing you agree to the terms and privacy policy. Prefer the app? Android · iPhone
