Upheaval

Upheaval

India should wait and watch and resist global pressure to move into Afghanistan.

It will mean a massive turnaround in India’s Afghanistan policy to send its soldiers into the war-torn neighbouring country. No current indication warrants such an approach even though friendly external powers want India to play an active, hard role in Afghanistan. The situation is similar to the one where the Quad members (the United States, Australia, India and Japan) would like India being their active spearhead in containing China. In the western theatre, China has planned joint action with Pakistan to fend off the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan even though the Afghan media has created a perception that Pakistan is aiding the Taliban. Still, China’s articulation may convince the West to prefer pulling India into the neighbourhood war. India, thus, already has its hands full trying to ensure that it is not forced into taking sides. India has clarified it is not “aware” of any “invitation” to be part of the American initiative through Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan or the Russia-US-China grouping on Afghanistan. The relationship between Kabul and New Delhi is shaped by the strategic partnership between the two countries signed in October 2011. It is the basis for their strategic efforts “against international terrorism”. India’s role is limited to training and equipping Afghan national security forces and executing capacity-building programmes. To go beyond this point will mean freshly assessing its Afghanistan policy that so far translated into India keeping itself out of the conflict but contributing to capacity building with an external power — the Iran-Russia front initially and, later, the United States — maintaining stability. This policy allowed India to keep away from the Taliban.

In the present scenario, however, the Taliban are forcing themselves to be at the centre-stage in Afghanistan, making it impossible to arrive at a resolution without involving them. The situation persuades all parties to decide what kind of contact to have with the Taliban. The other complication is, which of the factions of the Taliban to contact? There is the faction that depends on Pakistan’s support while another faction attempts to carve its political space with help from sections in the Middle East. Thirdly, what exactly would a country like India talk to the Taliban about when Pakistan-based terror outfits that are intent on destabilising India are said to be assisting the Taliban in Afghanistan? India will get a fair idea of where the United States, which is in the last stages of withdrawal from Afghanistan, stands on the question of stability in the region when its leadership meets visiting Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. India missed a first-hand briefing on the ground situation in Afghanistan because of the cancellation of the visit of the Afghan Army chief. The situation is not such that India can come to an informed decision about its future action. The external powers are still in the process of firming up their own positions and roles. Till then, India’s job is to wait and watch and resist international pressure to move in.