The quetta murders and its effect on china pakistan ties

The quetta murders and its effect on china pakistan ties

The killing of two Chinese nationals, abducted at gunpoint in the Balochistan capital Quetta in May, appears to have exposed fault lines between China and Pakistan, with Beijing issuing statements calling for Islamabad to do more to protect its citizens. To begin with, there have been reports of unhappiness over the $55-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — some Pakistani economists mention the debt burden Pakistan will face, and there have been protests by Gilgit, Baloch and Sindhi activists against the environmental impact of major infrastructure projects. There are also religious issues: Pakistan accused the two Chinese nationals, who had obtained business visas to teach Mandarin and learn Urdu, of being involved in Christian “missionary work”, which is unlawful in the country. The abduction and murder, first announced in the Islamic State site Amaq, also indicates the inroads the group has made in Pakistan. The Pakistan government, which has faced criticism in the Chinese media for not doing more to save the two Chinese nationals, will clearly have to speed up its plans for a Special Security Division to protect CPEC, raising nine army battalions and hiring about 14,000 personnel. It would, however, be a mistake to read too much into reports that the killings have caused strains between China and Pakistan, or Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
The two countries have had decades of close cooperation, led by defence co-production and nuclear technology transfers; if anything, CPEC binds them in an even closer embrace. In a recent statement, Beijing sought to dismiss reports suggesting that President Xi Jinping had refused to meet Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kazakhstan because of the kidnappings. It said the two leaders had already held substantive discussions during the Belt and Road Forum in mid-May. The killing of the Chinese nationals represents a lapse in security, but is part of what the Chinese Foreign Ministry calls the risks of “going global”, indicating that as its footprint grows in developing nations and conflict zones, its citizens will face higher risks. For both China and Pakistan, CPEC and other cooperation is not ideological but driven by mutual strategic interests. China has, for example, refused to consider India’s concerns on terror emanating from Pakistan, although groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba have attacked Chinese citizens. Similarly, Pakistan raises concerns over the alleged treatment of Kashmiris and minorities in India, but ignores the Chinese government’s strict anti-terror laws in Xinjiang province. While it is important to observe the progress of CPEC closely, and continue to raise India’s concerns on sovereignty with China and Pakistan, it is premature to attach too much lasting significance to the kidnappings in Balochistan.