Options when pax americana’s trumped

Options when pax americana’s trumped

The in-principle agreement to end the war in Afghanistan, struck between the US and Taliban, does not bode well for Afghanistan and peace and security in the region. The interim deal is effectively a capitulation by the US to the same insurgent group that it sought to defeat when it invaded Afghanistan in late 2001. The elected government of Afghanistan has little say in the deal and will be its first victim. President Trump’s America First isolationism demands pullout of US troops from Afghanistan and his recent government shutdown fiasco, with no progress towards his anti-immigrant wall, adds to the pressure to please his supporters. He can claim to have negotiated a commitment by the insurgent group to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a hub for attacks against the US and its allies.

The Taliban, however, remain non-committal on a ceasefire and direct talks with the Afghan government to settle post-conflict arrangements. The sidelining of the Afghan government represents a victory for the Taliban. The deal puts at risk the gains made over nearly two decades of de-radicalising Afghan life and custom, as the Taliban remains committed to imposition of Islamic law and conservative religious mores. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is right to fear a repeat of the chaos of the 1980s. Pakistan is the big winner and now will be in a position to enforce its opposition to India’s participation in Afghan reconstruction. China gains, too, through its patronage of Pakistan.

For India, the options are not good, but not nil. The US’ European allies are unlikely to make good the US deficit. Central Asian republics, Iran, Russia and even China, which has to be wary of Islamic radicalism in the neighbourhood of Xinjiang, must be rallied to limit the damage.