Kashmir cauldron i

Kashmir cauldron i

Kashmir is on the boil again and this is almost a repetition of the situation that prevailed in the Valley in 2016, after the killing of Burhan Wani, a militant leader of Hizbul Mujahideen. The fact that militancy would be revived with the onset of summer was fairly predictable; infiltration (the act of surreptitiously penetrate, enter or gain access) from across the border increased after the melting of snow in the mountainous regions. Militancy in Kashmir is sustained not only by the infiltrators pushed to the Indian side of the LoC by the Pakistani military/Rangers, but also by the financial assistance that the separatists/militants receive from across the border, as confirmed by the recent raids conducted by the NIA and the ED, and the confessions of the second-rung separatist leaders.
The money is channeled through conduits that have links with influential persons in business, politics and the administration. Unless serious attempts are made to break these links and stop the flow of foreign funds, terrorism in Kashmir cannot be dealt with effectively.
Arguably, the current turmoil (a state of great disorder or uncertainty) in Kashmir is sustained by the support ~ political/diplomatic, military as well as financial ~ that the separatists receive from across the border. But the problem has deeper roots and requires careful consideration, if the situation is to be retrieved.
When boys and girls studying in schools/colleges take to the streets and start pelting stones at the security forces, they do it out of frustration and a sense of alienation (a situation of estranged), although many among the stone-pelting youth might have been doing it at the behest (आदेश) of their masters who have recruited them for this job, perhaps on payment of pecuniary (of relating to money) benefits. But this would not have been possible without a sense of alienation, created by the lack of education and job opportunities.
This has been aggravated (to make worse) by the frequent disruption of normal life by the activities of separatists/militants, and the response of the security forces.
The stone-pelting youth were born during the turbulent 1990s and have lived through two decades of turbulence. Their anger and resentment is not unnatural, though all of them are not necessarily anti-Indian. It is significant that a young Kashmiri girl ~ who was a volleyball champion ~ was once involved in a stone-throwing incident to vent (to express a strong emotion) her frustration at the failure of the governmentto build a stadium for promoting the game. How could the situation in Kashmir become so volatile within three years after the J&K assembly elections in 2014? In terms of voter participation, it was a landmark election with more than 65 per cent voters exercising their right to vote, the highest in the past 25 years, despite the call for a poll boycott issued by the Hurriyat leaders.
Indeed, the turnout (attendance) was hailed by the European Parliament as an example of free and fair election. The current situation is to a large extent the result of the short-sighted policies of political parties that have been more interested in capturing power than in serving the people.
The 2014 Assembly election was preceded by the decision of the Congress to sever its alliance with the National Conference (NC), that ruled the state since 2008, and to contest all the 87 Assembly seats on its own. The result was disastrous for both parties. The election did not yield an absolute majority to any of the political parties.
Although the PDP won the largest number of seats (28) in the 2014 election,the biggest beneficiary was the BJP which campaigned vigorously, after its stunning(exceptionally amazing) victory in the 2014 Parliamentary elections held earlier in the same year, and increased its tally from 11 seats won in the 2008 elections to 25 in 2014.
Significantly, the BJP won the majority of seats in Jammu while the PDP won in Kashmir, indicating a clear geographical divide in the support bases of the two parties.
Ideologically, the PDP and the BJP are strange bedfellows, and the BJP had never been in power in Jammu and Kashmir.
Nevertheless, when the PDP-BJP coalition government was formed on 1 March 2015 after weeks of negotiations and bargaining, on the basis of a Common Minimum Programme, and with the slogan of Sabke hath sabke saath, people’s expectations were raised, especially because of the Prime Minister’s rhetoric. As it turned out, the government failed to deliver, especially after the death of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed.
This is nothing new, and is evident from the fact that while the Central government has over the years spent millions of rupees in the state for development, the benefits have not trickled down (arriving of financial benefits) to those who need it most. Corruption is rampant in Kashmir and according to some, nothing is possible without bribes ~ from admission to a school, getting a job or lodging an FIR in a police station. While corruption is an all India malaise, it has acquired an additional dimension in Kashmir because of ineffective governance.
People bare their angst against the government, particularly when the ruling party is in alliance with that at the Centre.
There are historical reasons for this. Kashmiris resent the progressive attenuation (the act of gradual diminishing in the strength of something) of autonomy. The process began soon after the accession of Kashmir to India and has continued to this day, in the name of integration.
As Sheikh Abdullah wrote to Nehru on 10 July, 1950: “I have several times stated that we acceded to India despite our having so many affinities (closeness) with Pakistan because we thought our programme will not fit with that policy.
If however we are driven to the conclusion that we cannot build our state on our own lines, suited to our genius, what answer can I give to my people and how am I to face them?” He was unseated from power unceremoniously and put behind bars on 9 August 1953 because he refused to follow New Delhi’s line on ‘integration’ of the state with the rest of India, and was allegedly toying with the idea of an independent Kashmir.
Thus by arresting the chief architect of Kashmir’s accession to India, New Delhi created a psychological chasm (a large difference of opinion) between the Kashmiris and the rest of India that is yet to be bridged. People in general became sceptical of the value of Article 370 of the Constitution, guaranteeing them the right to build the state ‘on their own lines’. Within a fortnight after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met and iterated their commitment to plebiscite (जनमत संग्रह) .
That Pakistan reneged on its pledge to withdraw its forces as a precondition for holding a fair plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, that had acceded to India, is a different matter. Had the plebiscite been held in the aftermath of signing the agreement brokered (mediated) by the UNCIP, on the modalities for withdrawal of forces by the two sides, perhaps India would have won comfortably even in the Valley. But that did not happen. What is more, neither India nor Pakistan really wanted Kashmir to be independent.
Nehru reportedly warned the National Conference leader that he would rather hand over Kashmir to Pakistan than allow an ‘independent’ Kashmir to be set up, which would soon become a centre of intrigues and international pressure. Perhaps he was not entirely wrong.
Since 1953, the state of Jammu and Kashmir had been ruled by leaders pliable (easily influenced or swayed by) to New Delhi’s advice and all the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly had been rigged, barring the one in 1977, with the parties supporting the demand for a plebiscite to decide Kashmir’s future. Dissension (प्रतिरोध) was suppressed and this alienated a large segment of the educated middle class, that was not a part of the ruling elite.
One could argue that with proper economic development of the state and the opportunity to express one’s views freely ~ as should happen in a democracy ~ the demand of the Plebiscite Front for a plebiscitein Kashmir would have lost its force.
That the majority of people in Kashmir were not necessarily anti-Indian was proved during the successive wars with Pakistan ~ in 1965, 1971 and again in 1999.